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ABSTRACT
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs)-based internet of things (IoT) are among the fast booming tech-
nologies that drastically contribute to different systems management and resilience data accessibil-
ity. Designing a robust IoT network imposes some challenges such as data trustworthiness (DT) and
power management. This paper presents a repeated game model to enhance clustered WSNs-based
IoT security and DT against the selective forwarding (SF) attack. Besides, the model is capable of
detecting the hardware (HW) failure of the cluster members (CMs) and conserve the power consump-
tion due to packet retransmission. The model relies on TDMA protocol to facilitate the detection
process and to avoid collision between the delivered packets at the cluster head (CH). The proposed
model aims to keep packets transmitting, isotropic or non-isotropic transmission, from the CMs to
the CH for maximizing the DT and aims to distinguish between the malicious CM and the one suffer-
ing from HW failure. Accordingly, it can manage the consequently lost power due to the malicious
attack effect or HWmalfunction. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism improved per-
formance with TDMA over six different environments against the SF attack that achieves the Pareto
optimal DT as compared to a non-cooperative defense mechanism.
Keywords Wireless Sensor Networks, Internet-of-things, Game Theory, Threats Mitigation, Power Conservation.
1 Introduction
According to the dramatic growth of the internet of things (IoT) technologies, IoT systems are utilized in a wide
range of applications. In particular, wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which can play a significant role in serving IoT
based applications such as smart cities, vehicular networks, environmental and earth monitoring, electrical power lines
management, renewable energy adaptation, etc [1–3]. However, WSNs suffer from some weaknesses such as limited
power, low processing capabilities, and especially the security and data trustworthiness (DT) aspects. Therefore,
WSNs-based IoT security and DT are enormous problems that desire an intelligent and adaptive solution to optimally
confront the day-to-day intellectual threats such as selective forwarding (SF), injection, and jamming attacks [4, 5].
In the literature context, various trust mechanisms have been proposed to resolve the WSNs security issues. In [6],
the authors discussed different intrusion detection systems (IDS), e.g., game theory-based IDS, watchdog-based IDS,
cluster-based IDS, etc., to mitigate the WSNs security problems. More particularly, in [7], game theory has been
deployed to establish a valid IDS to realize malware detection infrastructure. In fact, game theory is a dedicated
optimization branch that is utilized to handle the interactions of a set of intelligent rational players. More particularly,
it aims to enhance their individual payoffs by an intellectual and adaptive manner [8]. More concretely, game theory
has emerged due to the distinguishing features in managing the rational players interactions and mitigating several
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security threats in WSNs such as packet dropping, false data injection, and data delivery corruption [9–14]. However,
the above proposals do not consider the hardware (HW) failure which can make the system critically unstable.
The security issue and HW failure (fault) are among the eminent causes of packet dropping in WSNs, which have a
severe impact on the DT, network stability, and power consumption. From the security front, dropping packets is a
malicious incentive for saving transmission power in clustered WSNs-based IoT. Accordingly, the decision taken can
be harmful, which causes a steep degradation for the IoT networks’ DT. Moreover, HW failure has several defects. It
can cause packet dropping, packet repeating, or over packet transmission. The fault types can be categorized as offset
fault, gain fault, stuck-at fault, out of bounds, spike fault, noise fault, data loss fault, redundant data transmission [15].
In [16], the transmission round trip delay of the packets to detect the nodes that suffer from HW failure has been
utilized. In [15], the authors extensively studied the HW failure classifier methods such as support vector machine
(SVM), machine learning (ML), and random forest. However, most of the presented works in the literature context
have only considered the HW faults regardless of the security issue effect and how to distinguish between them. In [17],
a Stackelberg game has used to mitigate the corrupted delivered reports in cognitive radio networks due to the selective
forwarding data falsification attack in presence of an HW malfunction. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
further work has been presented in the literature focusing on classifying between attack effect and HW failure for
packet drop. Consequently, an intellectual and adaptive solution is desired to resolve these crucial issues along with
the WSNs limited power source.
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach using a repeated game to enhance WSNs-based IoT security and
DT against the SF attack and pinpoint the nodes that suffer from HW failure. The main contributions of the paper are
three folds:
• The proposed repeated game aims to detect the malicious CMs in clustered WSNs-based IoT due to the SF
attack impact, and simultaneously guarantee that no wrong action is taken even for a node caused by a HW
failure at a low probability. The TDMA protocol is used to preserve the synchronization between the CH
and CMs, which reduces the detection mechanism complexity and avoids the collision between the delivered
packets at the CH. In addition, the isotropic and non-isotropic packet transmissions have been taken in the
model consideration.
• The proposed approach models a real situation in which some packets can be dropped or over transmitted
due to HW failure of the CMs at the presence of SF attack. We verified that the model could improve the DT
performance with the presence of HW failure. It can determine the CMs that suffer from HW malfunction
among the CMs infected by the SF attack.
• The model attains the Pareto optimality at the optimal DT by resolving the issue of dropping packets due
to the SF attack effect. In other words, the model can prevent the designated malicious CMs from dropping
packets by supporting these CMs the incentive to act benevolently at which their battery life is conserved.
Furthermore, the model can preserve the lost power of packets over transmission or re-transmission as a result
of HW failure. The model efficiency is verified through simulation evaluation over six different environments,
outdoor line-of-sight (OL), outdoor non-line-of-sight (ON), underground line-of-sight (UL), underground
non-line-of-sight (UN), indoor line-of-sight (IL), and indoor non-line-of-sight (IN). Moreover, to draw a
realistic WSNs-based IoT system, Tmote Sky mote over the six different environments has been used.
The rest of the paper is portrayed as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. In Section 3, the system model
is discussed. The proposed game approach is then presented in Section 4, while the Pareto optimality and game
formulations are addressed in Section 5. Section 6 shows the obtained results. Finally, the paper conclusion is revealed
in Section 7.
2 Related Work
This section discusses the related works of the different WSNs HW failure detection methods and the security front
to promote WSNs performance. The security and HW failure in IoT is a prominent problem that can yield into losing
data privacy, DT, and wasting power as well. On the one hand, most of the works in the literature context concerning
the HW failure utilize the conventional paradigms, e.g., SVM, ML, and random forest by [15, 16] and self-diagnosis
and cooperative-diagnosis by [18–21].
In [18], the faulty node can be detected using redundant node measurements. Thus, the faulty one is isolated based
on its reputation obtained by as a minimum of three neighbor voting. Relying on the neighboring nodes was used
to adapt time correlation information between these nodes to detect faulty node/(s) [19]. An ineffective solution that
can cause more delay and cost that rely on using an extra HW (testbed) to check the faulty node [22]. In [20], three
statistical algorithms were studied for fault detection called time-series analysis, descriptive statistics, and Bayesian
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statistics. The time-series mechanism is utilized to detect packets similarities and to measure the amount of data
deviation. Descriptive statistics use the mean or median of neighboring nodes to vote for determining the faulty node.
Bayesian techniques were employed to determine the likelihood of a faulty sensor based on Bayes theorem. In [21],
the authors mentioned that the node could detect the failure by self-diagnosis, such as the faults caused by battery
depletion, which is measured by the battery current or voltage. Accordingly, if a node dropped or lost packets, an
extra memory should be embedded in the nodes to retrieve those packets and resend again-they said. The authors also
respite the lost packet to the environment condition that is why we study the proposed paradigm over six different
environments.
On the other hand, uncontrolled WSNs security can deteriorate the DT, data privacy, and power consumption. In
this trajectory, game theory has introduced several approaches [9–14, 23, 24]. In [9], the authors extensively studied
various WSN attacks and the suitable game defense models. In [24] Markovian chain was utilized to model the
game transitions for preserving the data privacy. In [10, 11], Stackelberg games have been developed to mitigate
the external attacks manipulations using energy defense to avoid the delivered data disruption in a clustered WSN.
Stackelberg game has also been extended to confront the false injected data from intelligent attacks in WSNs to
enhance the DT [12]. The Stackelberg gamewas also utilized to confront the false injected noise power inWSNs-based
cognitive radio (CR) due to the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack, where the HW failure problem was
considered [17]. The work in [17] aims to mitigate the disrupted observed signal-to-noise ratio due to the SSDF attack
to make the fusion center in CR capable of achieving accurate decision about the spectrum status. Interestingly, in [13],
a nonzero-sum game was proposed to mitigate DoS attack and ON-OFF attack impact and to detect the HW failure
in WSNs. The SF attack was handled by game theory in [11]. In [14], a repeated game model has been utilized to
enhanceWSNs DT against the SF attack. More particularly, the most effective parameter in that game was the distance
between the communicating nodes, which was criticized by [25]. Moreover, the model in [14] omitted the harmful
effect of HW failure and did not utilize the TDMA protocol as well. To solve this issue, a more intelligent game model
needs to be designed along with a robust detection scheme against the SF attack at the HW failure existence.
Unlike the previous related works, this paper presents an efficient repeated game-theoretic approach along with TDMA
protocol to classify between the cause of packet dropping in WSNs-based IoT whether a reason of malicious effect
due to SF attack or a result of HW failure to manage the consequent power waste and achieve the optimal DT. The
repeated game is considered the best among the cooperative games to support the adequate incentive to guarantee
collaborative interaction between the participant players at the price of elapsed time till reaching the equilibrium point,
which meets the flexibility of IoT applications time constraint. The proposed model presents the adequate incentive to
the malicious CMs due to SF attack to react benevolently and then, uncomplicatedly at the equilibrium point, detects
the CMs suffering from HW failure.
3 System model
Figure 1 illustrates system model using IoT based WSN. In this model, WSN consists of a set of CMs, N , where
the number of CMs in the cluster is given by the cardinality of the set N which is represented by |N |. Table 1 lists
the utilized notations and variables. For managing synchronization and packet transmission between the CMs and
CH in the clustered WSN, TDMA protocol is utilized as shown in Fig. 2. In fact, the proposed model is applicable
to work with different MAC protocols such as OFDM based protocols [14] but we utilize TDMA due to its features
supporting the power conservation. As extensively studied in the literature, TDMA is effective for prolonging the
network lifetime [26]. Moreover, dynamic TDMA, which is a MAC protocol based on scheduled time (DMAC), is
efficient for WSNs energy conservation, prolonging network lifetime, and avoiding overhearing [27]. Consequently, it
is an adequate intensive to employ TDMA protocol with the proposed approach.
This paper considers a game-theoretic model where each game player has two actions status. First, every i-th CM has
to execute either benevolent action by not dropping packets, no drop (ND); or malicious action by dropping packets,
drop (D). The D action is an incentive of the CM to save battery power. Second, the CH performs Beacon (B) or
no Beacon (NB) action status. The B action means that permission is given to the benevolent CM, does not drop
packets, to send their observed data. In addition, B is used to permit the i-th benevolent CM to go to the sleep mode,
to take a rest of packet transmission to save its battery lifetime, or to get power recovery when recharging power is
available. Conversely, the NB action is fundamentally used when the i-th CM action is D. Moreover, a controversial
CM performance occurs when it has a random HW failure at the same time of SF attack exist; specifically, the ones
suffering from dropping packets and over packets transmissions which are precisely considered through the proposed
model. In other words, the model can effectively classify between the infected CMs by the SF attack and the ones
suffering from HW failure. The TDMA is also utilized to gradually send the B to the benevolent CM when its turn
comes to transmit its data.
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Table 1: Notations of parameters and variables.
Symbol Description
N and |N | The set of CMs and the total number of CMs
Ai An individual action of i-th CM
A∗i The optimal action of i-th CM
Ai Set of action done by the i-th CM
ACH An individual action of the CH
A∗CH The optimal action of the CH
ACH Set of action done by the CH
A The action matrix
B andNB
Beacon and No Beacon actions done by
the CH, respectively
D andND Drop and No drop actions done by the CM, respectively
RSSI Received signal strength indicator
TC Transmission cost
TC0 Start up initial cost
TCA Amplification cost
V Battery voltage
T0 Offset (initial) start up time
I0 Consumed current when radio is ON
Ic Current supported by the battery at transmission level c
DR The transmission data rate
L The packet length in bits
PL
The path loss of the link between every i-th CM
and CH
PLf
The free space path loss at the reference distance of the
antenna far field
diCH The distance between the communicating CM i and CH
d0 The reference distance of the antenna far field
h Transmission power level
n The path loss exponent
σ The standard deviation of the shadow fading
η The path loss direction coefficient
θ The radiation coefficient angle
R A random value ∈]0, 1[
DOI Degree of irregularity
RL The reliability level
TP
The total number of packets per message
(a given window size)
pkt Data packet
Ui The The utility function of the i-th CM
ξi
A punishment (loss) parameter deducted
from the i-th CM utility
α and β Application dependent weighting factors
eb Transmission energy per bit
DT The data trustworthiness
DT The optimal data trustworthiness
rd The round number
Nrd The total number of rounds
Figure 3 shows the Beacon (B) action/message distribution after checking the CM behavior. At the beginning (Round
# 0), all CMs are supposed to be benevolent. Accordingly, the CH action for all CMs is B. After calculating (Ui)s
for all CMs (at Round # z), the CH can determine which CM has the right to be supported by the Beacon or not.
Therefore, if the i-th CM is benevolent and it is its turn using TDMA, it will receive the Beacon. On the contrary, if
this i-th CM is malicious (drops packets), the Beacon will not be sent to this i-th CM. Accordingly, this malicious
CM will keep re-transmission of the packets that will not receive acknowledgments on from the CH. Therefore, this
4
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Figure 1: Disaster management using WSNs-based IoT system.
approach can deteriorate the battery power of the CM that keeps on malicious behavior, and hence, this CM is prone
to going to die. To this end at (Round # Nrd), Nrd is the given period representing the total number of rounds, all
CMs are benevolent, and no one will be changed after that unless some of them have HW failure. Indeed, the CH
communicates with the CMs throughout a star topology, in which the communication link between each CM and the
CH is dedicated, to facilitate the check procedure of the received packets from every i-th CM. Therefore, it will be
a conventional topology to determine the benevolent CM that does not drop. To this end, there are four scenarios
in order due to the CH action (AiCH ) and the i-th CM action (Ai). Three scenarios out of these four represent the
one-shot games at which both the CH and CM perform the same action regardless of the other player’s action. The
last scenario introduces the rational interaction between the CH and the i-th CM as a reward and punishment defense
mechanism according to the action done by every CM. Based on this scenario, all the malicious rational CMs will
re-behave benevolently. Finally, the four actions status of the two players (i.e., CH and the i-th CM) are given by
• AiCH = NB and Ai = D
• AiCH = NB and Ai = ND
• AiCH = B and Ai =D
• AiCH = B and Ai = ND
4 Proposed Repeated Game Approach
The proposed game confirms a cooperative attitude between the CH (the defender) and the participant CMs. Indeed,
the CMs are assumed to act as rational players. The model is used to mitigate the potential malicious CMs that drop
the observed packets due to the effect of an intelligent SF attack. The proposed model provides an adequate incentive
5
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CM1
CH
CM2 CM|N|
Time Time Time Time Time
Figure 2: Packet transmission sequence using TDMA protocol.
for the CMs to react benevolently and not drop packets. Conversely, if a CM persists to behave maliciously, this CM
will not be given a permission to go to the sleep mode leading to shortly exhausting its battery.
Consequently, rational CMs will prefer to react benevolently because it is more profitable based on the proposed game.
This game leads to the Pareto optimality and nash equilibrium (NE) at which both players reach their optimal utility.
The utility function of every i-th CM per every iteration is computed using three main parameters, namely, received
signal strength indicator (RSSIi), reliability level (RLi), and a punishment parameter (ξi) between the CH and the
i-th CM, which is given by
Ui = αRSSIi + βRLi − ξi, (1)
α+ β = 1, (2)
where α and β are ”application dependent” weighting factors [14].
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CH
CM2CM1 CM|N|
CM2CM1 CM|N|
CM2CM1 CM|N|
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whether it is benevolent or malicious
Symbols Key
Benevolent node and it is its turn 
to take the beacon
Malicious node (punished = will not
take the beacon even it is its turn)
Round # 0
Round # 1
Round # Nrd
B / NB 
CM2CM1 CM|N|
Round # z
NB
Round # z
The round at which the i-th
malicious CM is detected
Beacon / No Beacon is sent
Figure 3: CH Beacon distribution for the CMs with TDMA.
4.1 Transmission Cost based Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
First, this parameter concentrates on the main effective factors of the transmission cost that are described as follows.
RSSI = TC − PL− Pn, (3)
where TC is the transmission cost while PL is the path loss and Pn is the noise power that are obtained from the
six exploited environments representing the link quality indicator (LQI) that the CM is deployed over. Pn and PL
parameters measurements are indicated in Table 2 [28]. Then, the transmission cost is expressed by
TC = TC0 + TCA, (4)
where TC0 is the initial cost that the CM starts up with, while TCA denotes the amplification cost for packet transmis-
sion. The initial cost can be given by
TC0 = V × I0 × T0, (5)
where V is the battery voltage exploited for transmission, I0 represents the current in Amperes when the radio is in
(ON state), and T0 is the initial start up time.
TCA = V × Ic ×
L
DR
, (6)
where Ic is the current in Amperes with a transmission power level c, L represents the packet length, and DR is the
transmission data rate. Table 3 shows the eight transmission levels along with the corresponding consumed electric
current using Tmote Sky mote [29]. The adopted path loss between every i-th CM and the CH (i, CH) is given by
7
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Table 2: Path loss parameters [28].
Environment n σ (dB) Pn (dBm)
Outdoor line-of-sight (OL) 2.42 3.12 -93
Outdoor non-line-of-sight (ON) 3.51 2.95 -93
Underground line-of-sight (UL) 1.45 2.45 -92
Underground non-line-of-sight (UN) 3.15 3.19 -92
Indoor line-of-sight (IL) 1.64 3.29 -88
Indoor Non-line-of-sight (IN) 2.38 2.25 -88
Table 3: Tmote Sky transmission levels and consumed electric current.
h Electric current consumed (mA)
3 8.5
7 9.9
11 11.2
15 12.5
19 13.9
23 15.2
27 16.5
31 17.4
PL[dB] =
(
PLf [dB] + 10n log 10
diCH
d0
)
× ηθ + σ[dB], (7)
where PLf is the free space path loss at the reference distance d0 of the antenna far-field, n denotes the path loss
exponent, diCH is the distance between the transmitting i-th CM and the CH, σ is the standard deviation in dB of
the shadow fading (log-normal distribution) measurements as indicated in Table 2, ηθ ∈]0, 1] is the path loss direction
coefficient when non-isotropic radiation is used, and θ represents the radiation coefficient angle which is depicted in
Fig. 4.
If the radiation is isotropic, ηθ = 1. On the other hand, when the radiation is non-isotropic ηθ is expressed by
ηθ =
{
1, if θ = 0
R×DOI, if 0◦ < θ < 360◦,
(8)
where R is a random value ∈]0, 1[ and the experienced values of degree of irregularity (DOI) are obtained from the
experiments presented in [25].
4.2 Reliability Level (RL)
Reliability level for the i-th CM (RLi) represents the percentage of transmitted packets from the total number of
packets (TP ) per message (i.e., window size) during a given period, which is given by the CH as
RLi =
∑TP
j=1 f(pkt
j
i )
TP
, (9)
f(pktji ) =


1, if j-th pkt is forwarded from i-th
CM to CH
0, if j-th pkt at i-th CM is dropped
(not forwarded to CH),
(10)
where pkt
j
i corresponds to the j-th forwarded packet (pkt) from i-th CM to the CH, and RLi ∈]0, 1].
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CM CM
CH
Ĭ = 0°
Ĭ
CH
CH
CH
… CH … Radiation direction … Cluster member
Symbol Key 
Isotropic radiation Non-isotropic radiation 
Figure 4: Isotropic and Non-isotropic radiation.
4.3 Punishment Parameter (ξ)
The punishment parameter for the i-th CM ξi in Eq. 1 is utilized to enhance the cooperation between the CH and the
participant CMs, which is calculated by
ξi =


x1, if AiCH = NB and Ai = ND
x2, if AiCH = B and Ai = D
x3, if AiCH = NB and Ai = D
0, if AiCH = B and Ai = ND,
(11)
where x1, x2, and x3 are given by
x1 =
TP∑
j=1
f(pktji )× L× eb, (12)
x2 =
(
TP −
TP∑
j=1
f(pktji )
)
× L× eb, (13)
x3 = x1 + x2, (14)
where eb denotes the transmission energy per bit, and TP is the total number of packets to be transmitted to the CH.
In fact, the term ξi in Eq. (1) is a loss parameter used to stimulate both CMs and CH to establish a cooperative
connection leading to prolonging the network lifetime where three main ξi cases are used for. First, the CH does
not send Beacon message to the i-th CM; however, the CM is benevolent by keeping packets transmission to the CH.
9
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Therefore, this CM cannot take a rest of packet transmission or go to the sleep mode for saving the battery lifetime at
which ξi = x1 due to the non-cooperative behavior of CH. Second, ξi equals x2 when the CM behaves maliciously by
dropping packets; however, the CH cooperates with it by sending it the Beacon. Third, the worst-case at which both
the CH and CM choose to be non-cooperative players for which ξi equals x3 = x1 + x2.
4.4 Data Trustworthiness (DT)
According to the above-mentioned subsections, the DT calculated by the CH is defined as the average utility function
[14] of all CMs during the given time period as
DT =
∑Nrd
rd=1
∑|N |
i=1 U
rd
i
Nrd
. (15)
It is worth mentioning that the relationship of the packet drop rate and the DT is inversely proportional.
4.5 The Proposed Model and Corresponding One Shot Games
The proposed repeated game is utilized to resolve the equivalent prisoner-dilemma [8] using the available four scenar-
ios based on the players’ actions. The game is developed to fulfill the Pareto optimal point and NE point at the same
state. The first three scenarios represent a one-shot game of prisoner-dilemma between the CH and the i-th CM in
which the DT does not reach to its optimal value. The last scenario presents the proposed repeated game versus the
other one-shot games, which are discussed as follows:
• In the first scenario, all CMs actions are to cooperate with the CH by not dropping any packet (ND). In
other words, they behave benevolently with the CH. On the other hand, the CH action is NB to be sent to
the CMs even they are benevolent. Accordingly, the utility function is affected by Eq. (12) of the punishment
parameter.
• In the second scenario, the CH chooses to exert B action for all CMs. Conversely, the CM action is to drop
(D) packets aiming at saving battery lifetime. Therefore, the punishment parameter here is represented by
Eq. (13).
• The third scenario is the worst one at which the minimal utility is obtained due to the CH and CM actions,
NB and D, respectively. It means that the CH does not provide the CM by the Beacon, and this CM action
is to drop packets. Consequently, the punishment parameter (ξ) is calculated based on Eq. (14). Therefore,
these malicious CMs will not be permitted to go to sleep mode, and hence, they are not capable of preserving
their battery lifetime.
• The fourth scenario represents the proposed repeated game model for handling the behavior of the i-th ma-
licious CM. At the equilibrium point, the CH and all i-th CM choose to cooperate by exerting B and ND
actions, respectively. More particularly, both RL and utility functions are maximized. Generally speaking, the
process of permitting or preventing a CM from the Beacon message until reaching the optimal DT is based
on (Algorithm 1). In this algorithm, if a CM drops packets, it will be designated as malicious or suffers
from HW failure. In other words, the dropping packets CM will be designated as malicious or labeled in the
HW failure list (HWL). Then, this i-th CM will go through a punishment cycle till reacting benevolently. At
satisfying two constraints, the round number rd = i+ i|N | comes and this i-th CM reacts benevolently again,
this i-th CM will be given the Beacon. For instance, if |N | equals 10 and CM 3 is malicious, the Beacon will
be supplied to this CM only when it re-behaves benevolently at rd = 33. This scheme is recursively executed
Nrd = c|N | times till achieving the optimal DT, where c ∈ R+ > |N |. Consequently, when the CM action
is ND, its gain is much higher than when its action is D for its utility function. Similarly, when the CH
action is B to the CMs, their utility functions are enhanced, which yields to the optimal DT. Therefore, this
process is called the punish and forgive strategy. Finally, both the CH and the designated rational malicious
CM based on this game will prefer to cooperate due to the gain they can earn. In other words, the cooperative
interaction between CH and CMs leads the Pareto optimality and NE at the same state by reaching the opti-
mum DT. After that, any CM drops packets or does over packet transmission is a result of HW failure, which
is listed in HWL and quietly detected by the CH.
5 Pareto Optimality and Game Formulations
The proposed repeated game is between the CH (defender) and every i-th CM, which is denoted by
G = 〈{CH, i},A, Ui〉. (16)
10
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Algorithm 1: Proposed Repeated Game Algorithm for SF attack.
1 Input AiCH = {B,NB}, Ai = {D,ND} ;
2 while d ≤ c|N | do
3 Compute RSSIi, RLi, ξi, and Ui by Eqs. (3), (9), (11) and (1) ∀i ∈ |N |;
4 Determine the malicious CMs or the ones have HW failure;
5 if CMi drops pkt → Ai is D then
6 This i-th CM→ malicious/HWL;
7 else
8 This i-th CM is designated as benevolent and No HW failure;
9 end
10 if Ai of this i-th CM is ND and rd = i+ i|N | then
11 This i-th CM will receive B message (AiCH → B);
12 else
13 This i-th CM will be listed in HWL;
14 end
15 if DT is calculated using Eq. (15) and (AiCH , Ai) → (A
∗
CH , A
∗
i ) ∀i then
16 DT is optimal andNE exists;
17 else
18 Continue;
19 end
20 end
21 Output Optimal DT is attained and (A∗CH , A
∗
i ), ∀i→ NE exists;
22 if Ai = D then
23 This i-th CM suffers from a HW failure;
24 end
The CH set of actions ACH represent the CH defense strategy DSCH(ξi, DT ) against the designated malicious CM.
Conversely, Ai denotes the i-th CM malicious strategyMSCM (f(pkt
j
i ), DT ) at which the j-th packet is dropped by
the i-th CM.
The best strategy is achieved using the proposed game represented by the fourth scenario in which the optimal action
of the i-th CM A∗i ∈ Ai is given by
A∗i = argmax
ξi=0
(Ui). (17)
More concretely, the optimal action of the i-th CM and CH are given by
A∗i = ND → f(pkt
j
i ) = 1, ∀j ∈ TP, (18)
A∗CH = argmax
f(pktj
i
)=1,∀j∈TP,∀i∈N ,j 6=i
(DT ). (19)
Taking into consideration the rationality principle of the participant players, the CH will choose to cooperate and use
B action. Consequently,A∗CH can be simplified as
A∗CH = B → ξi = 0, ∀i. (20)
Consequently, the NE is achieved, which is given here by
Ui(A
∗
CH , A
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(A
i
CH , A
∗
i ), ∀i ∈ N . (21)
Then, we prove that both the Pareto optimal and NE point are achieved in the same state as follows:
Let the Pareto optimality is attained at optimal DT (DT ). Consequently, any other value of DT is less than this optimal
value as
DT ≥ DT. (22)
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DT is attained using the punish-and-forgive strategy that is presented in the fourth scenario, which is derived by
DT = min
ACH
max
Ai,∀i∈N
DT, (23)
min
ACH=B
ξi = 0 ∀i ∈ N , (24)
∴ Ui = αRSSIi + βRLi, ∀i. (25)
max
Ai,∀i∈N
f(pktji ), ∀j ∈ TP, ∀i ∈ N , j 6= i, (26)
Accordingly,A∗i = ND → f(pkt
j
i ) = 1, ∀i ∈ N , j 6= i, and A
∗
CH = B → ξi = 0, ∀i ∈ N
∴ RLi = 1, ∀i ∈ N , (27)
∴ DT > DT. (28)
Consequently, the NE and Pareto optimality are achieved at the same state whenDT exists at (A∗CH , A
∗
i ), ∀i ∈ N .
6 Simulation results and Discussion
This section shows the simulation results. The simulation parameters are depicted in Table 4. We use Tmote Sky mote
as a realistic node model among the most usable nodes with standard of IEEE 802.15.4 supporting precise locations
and scalability for IoT platforms [30] that equipped by the Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller with a Chipcon
CC2420 radio, and utilize the parameters from its datasheet in [29]. We also assumed that 20% of CMs suffer from a
random HW failure, and all CMs use power level h = 31 as an empirically selected optimum value. The utilized DOI
measurement values are {0.0055, 0.0035, 0.004, 0.0045, 0.006, 0.0085} [25]. All CMs are located at the maximum
coverage range between the CH and every Tmote Sky CM (125 m) to show the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Besides, the DT of the received signal is affected by Pn, path loss, and shadowing fading (log-normal distribution with
standard deviation σ). We assume six environment scenarios (i.e., OL, ON, UL, UN, IL, and IN), where their path loss
parameters are given in Table 2 [28]. Rayleigh fading is not taken into consideration.
Figure 5 illustrates the improved performance using the proposed game as compared to the work in [14]. It is clear
that the normalized DT of the proposed game reaches the equilibrium state much faster than the corresponding game
model in [14]. Moreover, the obtained normalized DT of the three one-shot games involved in this paper gets worse
as compared to the proposed repeated game and corresponding results in [14]. It means that the proposed repeated
game is more effective than the work in [14] for stimulating the CH and CM to cooperate using B and ND actions,
respectively.
Figure 6 shows the obtained results of the proposed repeated game model as compared to the three one-shot games. It
is clear that after the equilibrium point, the model maximizes the normalized DT leading to the optimal DT whether
Table 4: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
|N | 10
No. of randomly assumed
malicious CM
1 and 2
L 1024 bits T0 580 µs
I0 µA DR 250 Kb/s
Ic 17.4 mA V 3 Volts
α and β 0.6 and 0.4 eb 50 nJ
d0 10 m [29] diCH 125 m [29]
PLf 55 dB h 31
TP 100 c 11
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the number of malicious CMs equals 1 or 2. We succeeded to prove that in both the isotropic and non-isotropic packet
transmission. The minimum normalized DT is achieved by the third scenario when the CH and CM actions are NB
andD, respectively. This is because the punishment parameter is considered doubled using Eq. (14). The normalized
DT of the first and second one-shot games (first and second scenarios) get better performance than the third one but
are still less than the proposed game results.
Figure 7 shows a comparison between the obtained normalized utility functions of the isotropic and non-isotropic
packet transmission using the proposed repeated game model over the six environments (OL, ON, UL, UN, IL, and
IN) with each DOI measurements. Generally speaking, all the obtained results with any environment are close to their
corresponding ones regardless of the DOI value. It is clear from Fig. 7a-d, with IN environment type, at which the
values of σ and n are very close, the change of DOI does not affect the model performance as both the normalized utility
of the isotropic and non-isotropic transmission are overlapped. Interestingly, we can observe that the non-isotropic
exceeds the isotropic packet transmission by only 1% - 4% that reflects the efficiency of the proposed model.
Detecting HW failure is discussed using both Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b). At the equilibrium point, all the rational
malicious attempts are refrained whether with isotropic or non-isotropic packet transmission. Afterward, any dropping
packet or over packet transmission will be due to the HW failure not the SF attack. Figure 8(a) shows the normalized
utilities of the 10 CMs in which the values that exceed 100% are due to the over packet transmission of the CMs that
suffer from HW failure such as CM 4 and 8. The UL environment has the least path loss exponent that reflects the
minimum effect on the isotropic radiation of packets. Therefore, the best-normalized utilities of using the proposed
model with the isotropic packet transmission among the six environments are in the UL environment in which the
utilities reach 96.8%. Conversely, the ON environment represents the worse effect on the optimal isotropic normalized
utilities, which reach only 93.5%, as shown in Fig. 8(b).
Afterward, the enhanced performance and model efficiency using the number of successfully transmitted packets have
been depicted in Fig. 9 using isotropic transmission over the ON environment representing the worst constraints. The
number of transmitted packets counted at the equilibrium state based on the proposed repeated game is quite higher
than the other three one-shot games as a result of the attack presence. In this regard, based on the proposed model
along with the TDMA protocol, the CH can receive a much higher number of trusted packets from the CMs leading
to the optimum DT in the six environments and DOIs. In other words, the model effectiveness has been achieved
against the SF attack regardless of the environment and DOI types and whether the packet transmission is isotropic or
non-isotropic.
Moreover, the comparison between the lost power using the proposed model and without detection mechanism against
the SF attack is shown in Fig. 10 over ON environment representing the worst constraints. If the proposed model has
not been used, the network will be prone to lose a valuable amount of power due to the SF attack and the undiscov-
ered CMs that suffer from HW failure, leading to battery power deterioration that increases with the increase of the
number CMs as shown in Fig. 10. More particularly, the intensive power degradation is a result of giving negative ac-
knowledgment by the CH to the malicious CMs and hence, they recursively transmit those packets that do not receive
acknowledgments. Moreover, these CMs will not receive the Beacon to take a rest from the transmission or to go to
the sleep mode. Therefore, the fraudulent behavior of the CMs will aggravatingly contribute to exhaust their battery
lifetime.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between the elapsed time and the number of CMs over the ON environment repre-
senting the worst constraints. The obtained results compare between the obtained results based on the proposed model
and the corresponding work in [14]. It is clearly shown that the time consumption using the proposed model is much
less than the work in [14] regardless of the number of CMs. Moreover, the proposed model presents an enhanced
performance result regardless of increasing the number of CMs.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient repeated game defense model along with the TDMA protocol to effectively
detect the SF attack and HW failure in clustered WSNs-based IoT systems. The developed model can stimulate the
malicious CMs that drop packets to react benevolently and hence, facilitate the HW failure detection to achieve the
optimal DT. Consequently, the model solves a prisoner-dilemma problem and is capable of attaining both the Pareto
optimality and NE at the same state when the maximum DT exists. Moreover, the model proves beneficial in security
enhancement, maximizing DT, and managing the consequently lost power leading to robust IoT networks. Simulation
results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model regardless of the environment, DOI, and isotropic and
non-isotropic transmissions achieving robust WSNs-based IoT by preventing the packet drop due to the SF attack.
Furthermore, the model can maximize the number of successfully transmitted packets. One of the future works is to
evaluate our approach using testbed.
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Figure 5: Normalized DT comparison between the proposed model and the corresponding in the literature using
Non-isotropic transmission over UL environment, number of malicious CMs equals 2.
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Figure 7: Utility comparison of isotropic and non-isotropic packet transmission based on only the proposed repeated
game over the six environments at every DOI, when number of malicious CMs equals 2.
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environments, 20% of CMs suffer from HW failure.
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